Wage-price dynamics : are they consistent with cost push? by Yash Mehra
Wage-Price Dynamics: Are




or gauging inﬂationary pressures, many policymakers and ﬁnancial
market analysts pay close attention to the behavior of wages. It is
widely believed that if wage costs rise faster than productivity, the
price level may rise as ﬁrms pass forward increased wage costs in the form
of higher product prices. Hence changes in productivity-adjusted wages1 are
believed to be a leading indicator of future inﬂation.
One problem with this popular “cost-push” view of the inﬂation process
is that it does not recognize the inﬂuences of Federal Reserve policy and the
resulting inﬂation environment on determining the causal inﬂuence of wage
growthoninﬂation. IftheFedfollowsanon-accommodativemonetarypolicy
and keeps inﬂation low, then ﬁrms may not be able to pass along excessive
wage gains in the form of higher product prices. In fact, an alternative view is
that inﬂation is a “monetary” phenomenon and is caused by excess aggregate
demand. According to this view, the causation runs from inﬂation to wage
growth: ﬁrms are able to raise the price of their products because of excess
aggregate demand caused by an expansionary monetary policy. The resulting
increase in prices leads workers to demand higher wages.
In this article, I investigate whether wage-price dynamics are consistent
with the cost-push view of the inﬂation process. The cost-push view implies
that Fed policy and the resulting inﬂation environment do not matter in de-
termining the ability of ﬁrms to pass forward higher wage costs in the form
of higher product prices. Higher wage growth should lead to higher future
The author wishes to thank Robert Hetzel, Huberto Ennis, and Roy Webb for helpful com-
ments. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reﬂect those of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
1 The term “productivity-adjusted wage growth” refers to wage growth in excess of produc-
tivity gains, measured here by growth in unit labor costs. The empirical work here focuses on
this measure of wage growth.
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inﬂation irrespective of what Fed policy has been and whether inﬂation has
been high or low. I test this implication in two ways. First, I investigate
whether there exists a long-term equilibrium relation between the price level
andthelevelofwagesand,ifitexists,whetherthatequilibriumrelationcanbe
interpretedasthelong-termpriceequation, meaningthepriceleveliscausally
related to wages. The cost-push view implies that the long-term equilibrium
relation is in fact the long-term price equation in which wages can be con-
sidered exogenous. Then, the estimated coefﬁcient that appears on the wage
variable measures the long-term response of the price level to wages. Second,
even if a long-term relation between the levels of price and wage series does
not exist, short-term changes in them may still be correlated. If the cost-push
view is correct, then wage growth should help predict inﬂation and such pre-
dictive content should be invariant to changes in Fed policy and the inﬂation
regime.
Itesttheseimplicationsofthecost-pushviewusingdataontheU.S.sample
period 1952Q1 to 1999Q2. During this sample period both the nature of mon-
etary policy pursued by the Federal Reserve and the behavior of inﬂation have
varied considerably. In particular, this period contains two subperiods, 1952
to 1965 and 1983 to 1999, during which inﬂation remained low to moderate
and one subperiod, 1966 to 1982, during which inﬂation steadily accelerated.
Furthermore,thedescriptiveanalysisofmonetarypolicyinGoodfriend(1993)
andthemonetarypolicyreactionfunctionsestimatedmorerecentlyinClarida,
Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Mehra (1999) indicate that since 1979 the Fed
has concentrated on maintaining low inﬂation. It is widely believed that as
a result of such policy, inﬂation declined sharply in the early 1980s and has
remained low to moderate since then.2 The cost-push view implies that the
predictivecontentofwagegrowthforfutureinﬂationshouldbestableoverthis
sample period. As in some previous research, these wage-price dynamics are
investigated using techniques of cointegration, Granger-causality, and weak
exogeneity.
Other studies have previously investigated whether wage growth helps
predict inﬂation. Mehra (1991), Hu and Trehan (1995), and Gordon (1998)
reportevidencethatindicateswagegrowthhasnopredictivecontentforfuture
inﬂation. Emery and Chang (1996) and Hess (1999) point out that the ﬁnd-
2 The breakpoints used here are suggested by a cursory look at inﬂation data, measured by
the behavior of the GDP deﬂator. The hypothesis that holds that breaks in inﬂation are related
to changes in monetary policy has been tested in Webb (1995). Based on his reading of FOMC
minutes and ﬁscal and political commentary, Webb points out monetary policy changed ﬁrst around
the mid-1960s and then the early 1980s. He sees monetary policy making a discrete move toward
more inﬂation at some point in the middle of the 1960s and another move toward lower inﬂation
in the early 1980s. Thus three periods identiﬁed are: an early low inﬂation period from 1952Q2
to 1966Q4; a middle inﬂationary period from 1967Q1 to 1981Q2; and a disinﬂationary period
from 1981Q3 to 1990Q4. The three sample periods are close to those studied here. However, one
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ing that wage growth helps predict inﬂation is sensitive to the sample period
chosen. In contrast, Ghali (1999) reports Granger-causality test results that
indicate wage growth does predict inﬂation, implying the cost-push view is
correct. The main criticism of the previous empirical work, including the one
inGhali(1999),istheabsenceofdiscussionabouttheinﬂuencesofFedpolicy
and the resulting inﬂation environment on determining the causal inﬂuence
of wage growth on inﬂation. Hence the issue of the stability of wage-price
dynamics has essentially been ignored. Furthermore, the predictive content
in previous work is generally investigated using tests of Granger-causality
summarizedbytheconventionalF-statistic. However, itisimportanttoassess
the quantitative size of the predictive content. I therefore provide evidence on
the size of the feedback between wages and prices, reporting the “magnitude”
of the sum of coefﬁcients that appear on lagged wage growth in predicting
inﬂation.3
The empirical work presented here does not favor the cost-push view.
The results indicate that the price level and the productivity-adjusted wage
(measured here by the level of unit labor costs) are indeed cointegrated over
the full sample period 1952Q1 to 1999Q2, meaning there exists a long-term,
equilibrium relation between prices and wages. However, this equilibrium
(cointegrating) relation cannot be interpreted as the long-term price equation
because wages are not found to be exogenous. Thus, the estimated coefﬁcient
that appears on the wage variable does not measure the long-term response
of the price level to wages, as implied by the cost-push view. The evidence
rather indicates this equilibrium relation is the wage equation, in which prices
can be considered exogenous.
The test results for Granger-causality indicate that over the full sample
period 1952Q1 to 1999Q2, higher wage growth does lead to higher future
inﬂation, as predicted by the cost-push view. However, the estimated, short-
run feedback from wage growth to inﬂation is quantitatively modest and quite
unstable during the sample period. In particular, the full sample result that
wage growth helps predict future inﬂation is mainly due to the inclusion of
observations from the high inﬂation subperiod 1966 to 1983. Wage growth
does not help predict inﬂation during two low inﬂation subperiods, 1952Q1
to 1965Q4 and 1984Q1 to 1999Q2. In contrast, inﬂation always helps predict
future wage growth, this result holding in all subperiods. Furthermore, the
estimated, short-run feedback from inﬂation to wage growth is quantitatively
large, with the estimated feedback coefﬁcient close to unity, indicating wage
growth has adjusted one-for-one with inﬂation. Consequently, the result that
wage growth helps predict inﬂation only during the subperiod of high and
rising inﬂation does not favor the cost-push view of the inﬂation process. It
3An exception is the recent work in Gordon (1998). He does not, however, investigate the
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is only during a highly inﬂationary environment that ﬁrms are able to pass
forward higher wage costs in the form of higher product prices, suggesting
causation that runs from excess aggregate demand to inﬂation and to wages.
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 1 reviews the
economic rationale of why wages and prices may move together over time.
Section 2 presents empirical results. Section 3 contains concluding observa-
tions.
1. SHORT-RUN WAGE-PRICE DYNAMICS: ECONOMIC
RATIONALAND TESTING
The view that systematic movements in wages and prices are related can be
rationalized in a number of ways. One such rationalization can be derived
from the expectations-augmented Phillips curve view of the inﬂation process.
Consider the price and wage equations that typically underlie such Phillips
curve models described in Gordon (1985, 1988) and Stockton and Glassman
(1987).
 pt = h0 + h1 (w − q)t + h2x1 + h3spt (1)
 (w − q)t = k0 + k1 pe







w is the nominal wage rate, q is labor productivity, x is a demand pressure
variable, pe is the expected price level, sp represents supply shocks affecting
the price equation, sw represents supply shocks affecting the wage equation,
and   is the ﬁrst difference operator. Equation (1) describes the price markup
behavior. Prices are marked over productivity-adjusted wage costs4 and are
inﬂuenced by cyclical demand and the exogenous, relative supply shocks.
This equation implies that productivity-adjusted wages determine the price
level, given demand pressures. Equation (2) is the wage equation. Wages
are assumed to be a function of cyclical demand and expected price level, the
latter modeled as a lag on past prices as in (3). The wage equation, together
withequation(3), impliesthatwagesdependuponpastprices, ceterisparibus.
4As shown in Nordhaus (1972), this pricing equation can be derived from the optimizing
behavior of ﬁrms. Under assumptions of Cobb-Douglas production function, constant returns, the
constant relative price of capital, and proﬁt maximizing behavior, the optimal price equation looks
like one as in (1), with h1 = 1. The last result implies that prices adjust one-for-one with wages
in the long run.Y. Mehra: Wage-Price Dynamics 31
Thepriceandwagebehaviordescribedabovesuggeststhatlong-runmove-
ments in wages and prices must be related. Furthermore, if one allows for
short-run dynamics in such behavior, the analysis above would also suggest
thatpastmovementsinwagesandpricesshouldhelppredictfuturechangesin
those same variables, ceteris paribus. In previous research these implications
have been tested using tests for cointegration and Granger-causality between
wage and price series.5 In this article, I also use tests for weak exogeneity
proposedbyHendry,Engle,andRichard(1983). Furthermore,followingGor-
don (1998) I also present evidence on the magnitude of the feedback between
wage growth and inﬂation.
Toillustrate,assumethatwageandpriceseriesarecointegrated,indicating
thatwagesandthepricelevelcomoveinthelongrunandthatthecointegrating
relation is given in (4).
pt = a0 + a1(w − q)t + Ut (4.1)
(w − q)t =− (a0/a1) + (1/a1)pt − (1/a1)Ut, (4.2)
whereUt isthedisturbanceterm. In(4.1)thecointegratingrelationisnormal-
izedonthepricevariable,whereasin(4.2)itisnormalizedontheproductivity-
adjusted wage. That the ﬁnding wages and prices are cointegrated simply im-
pliesthatthesetwovariablesarecorrelatedinthelongrun,butcorrelationdoes
not necessarily indicate causation. In order to investigate whether this ﬁnding
about the presence of cointegration between prices and wages can be given a
causal interpretation, Hendry, Engle, and Richard (1983) have proposed tests
for weak exogeneity. In particular, the wage variable in the cointegrating re-
gression(4.1)canbeconsideredgivenindeterminingtheresponseoftheprice
level to wages if wages are weakly exogenous with respect to the long-term
parameter a1. In that case, one can causally interpret (4.1) as the long-term
priceequation,theparametera1 measuringthelong-termresponseoftheprice
level to wages. Conversely, if wages are not weakly exogenous but the price
levelis,thenonecanreformulate(4.1)as(4.2)andinterpretitasthelong-term
wage equation with the parameter (1/a1) measuring the long-term response
of wages to prices. If the “price markup” hypothesis holds in the long run,
and hence the popular cost-push view of the inﬂation process is correct, then
wages should be weakly exogenous in (4.1).
The test for weak exogeneity amounts to examining whether the residual
U enters signiﬁcantly in inﬂation and wage regressions of the forms (5) and
(6).
5 See, for example, Mehra (1991), Hu and Trehan (1995), Gordon (1998), and Ghali (1999).32 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
 pt = b0 + λ1Ut−1 +
s  
j=1
b1j pt−j + ε1t (5)
 (w − q)t = c0 + λ2Ut−1 +
s  
j=1
c1j (w − q)t−j + ε2t (6)
Wages are weakly exogenous in (4.1) if λ2 is zero, whereas prices are weakly
exogenous in (4.2) if λ1 is zero. Intuitively, the test for weak exogeneity
amountstodeterminingwhetherthelong-runcomovementofpricesandwages
istheresultofwagesadjustingtoprices,pricesadjustingtowages,orboth. The
cost-push view of the inﬂation process implies that the long-run comovement
is the result of prices adjusting to wages, not wages adjusting to prices. Hence
cointegrating regression (4.1) is the price equation in which the price level is
causally determined by wages in the long run.
The tests for cointegration and weak exogeneity discussed above focus
on the presence and the nature of the long-run correlation between wage and
price series. However, even if a long-term cointegrating relation does not
exist, we may still ﬁnd that wage growth and inﬂation are correlated in the
short run. If the price markup hypothesis holds in the short run, then wage
growth may help predict future inﬂation. In previous research, this issue has
been investigated using tests for Granger-causality. In particular, consider the
following inﬂation and wage growth equations:






b2j (w − q)t−j +
s  
j=1
b3jCDt−j + ε1t, (7)
 (w − q)t = c0 + λ2Ut−1 +
s  
j=1






c3jCDt−j + ε2t, (8)
where CD stands for cyclical demand and where other variables are deﬁned
as before. These equations include the error-correction variable Ut−1, in case
wage and price series are cointegrated. The test of the hypothesis that wages
helppredictinﬂationintheGranger-causalsenseisthatallb2j  = 0and/orλ1  =
0. InpreviousworkthistesthasusuallybeencarriedoutusingtheconventionalY. Mehra: Wage-Price Dynamics 33
F-statistic,withoutpayingmuchattentiontotheissueofwhethertheestimated
effect of wage growth on inﬂation is quantitatively large or modest. Hence,
in order to estimate the relative quantitative effects of lagged wage growth
and inﬂation on each other, I consider below the following transformation of
inﬂation and wage-growth equations (Gordon 1998).6
 pt = b0 +λ1Ut−1 +
s  
j=1
(b1j +b2j) pt−j +
s  
b2j (w −q −p)t−j +
s  
j=1
b3jCDt−j + ε1t (9)
 (w − q)t = c0 + λ2Ut−1 +
s  
j=1
(c1j + c2j) (w − q)t−j +
s  
j=1
c2j (p − (w − q))t−j +
s  
j=1
c3jCDt−j + ε2t (10)
Equation (9) comes about if we add and subtract b2j pt−j terms in (7),
whereas equation (10) comes about if we add and subtract c2j (w − q)t−j
terms in (8). In inﬂation equation (9), the “freely estimated”7 sum of coefﬁ-
cients
 s
j=1 b2j indicate the weight on lagged wage growth in the determina-
tion of inﬂation, once we control for the inﬂuence of lagged inﬂation. Hence,
wage growth is an independent source of cost-push inﬂation if the estimated
sum of coefﬁcients
 s
j=1 b1j is positive and statistically different from zero,
6 The reformulated inﬂation equation (9) incorporates the view that inﬂation and wage growth
comove in the short run. Consider an increase in past wage growth. If this increase in past wage
growth is simply due to past inﬂation, then such increase in past wage growth should have no
additional effect on current inﬂation if the inﬂuence of past inﬂation is already accounted for in
the inﬂation equation. Thus, in order to capture the additional inﬂuence of past wage growth on
inﬂation, past wage growth in excess of past inﬂation is included ((w − q)− p) in the inﬂation
equation, which also includes past inﬂation itself. Past wage growth, then, is an independent source
of inﬂation if past wage growth measured as deviations from past inﬂation is signiﬁcant. There
are several advantages of this reformulation. First, the sum of coefﬁcients appearing on past wage
growth directly measures the magnitude of the effect of past wage growth on inﬂation. Second,
one can impose and test restrictions on the sum of coefﬁcients appearing on lagged inﬂation. For
example, the “natural-rate hypothesis” implies coefﬁcients on past inﬂation sum to unity. One can
test whether past wage growth is still relevant when the natural-rate hypothesis holds, as in Gordon
(1998). Third, including wage growth measured as deviations from inﬂation reduces the degree of
multicolinearity among right-hand-side variables, enabling more precise estimation by ordinary least
squares. Fourth, if one estimates without imposing any restrictions on the coefﬁcients that appear
on past inﬂation, tests for Granger-causality conducted using the reformulated inﬂation equation
should yield results similar to those conducted using the conventional inﬂation equation (7). Similar
considerations hold for the reformulated wage-growth equation (10). The empirical work reported
here does not impose any restrictions on coefﬁcients in the inﬂation equation, meaning wage-growth
coefﬁcients are “freely estimated.”
7 See footnote 6.34 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
its estimated magnitude measuring the size of the feedback from wage growth




once we control for the inﬂuence of lagged wage growth. Therefore, inﬂation
is an independent source of wage growth if the estimated sum
 s
j=1 c2j is
positive and statistically different from zero. I test these hypotheses using
the conventional F- and t-statistics, besides reporting the estimated sum of





real-over-potential GDP or by ﬁrst differences of the civilian unemployment
rate. Since supply shocks could have short-term effects on wages and prices,
tests of predictive content are conducted including some of these in the sys-
tem. The supply shocks considered here include the relative price of imports.
Dummy variables for the period of President Nixon’s wage and price controls
and for the period immediately following the wage and price controls are also
included. Potential GDP is the series generated using the Hodrick-Prescott
(1997) ﬁlter. The data used are quarterly and cover the sample period 1952Q1
to 1999Q2.
A Preliminary Look at the Data
Figure 1 takes a preliminary look at prices and unit labor costs. It charts
year-over-year growth rates of productivity-adjusted wages measured by unit
labor costs and the general price level over 1952Q1 to 1999Q2. This ﬁgure
clearly indicates that in the short run, productivity-adjusted wage growth and
inﬂationappeartocomovecloselyonlyoverasubperiodthatbeginsinthemid
1960s and ends in the early 1980s. This subperiod is the one during which
inﬂation steadily accelerated. In the remaining subperiods, there does not
appear to be much strong comovement between wage growth and inﬂation,
at least in the short run. During these two subperiods, inﬂation remained low
to moderate. Figure 1 clearly suggests that the relationship between inﬂation
and wage growth may not be stable during the sample period considered here.
Figure 2 is similar to Figure 1 except that it charts wage growth measured
by compensation per hour. It also reveals that wage growth and inﬂation do
not comove strongly over the full sample period. Sometime since the early
1980s, however, the short-run relationship between inﬂation and wage growth
appears to have weakened signiﬁcantly.Y. Mehra: Wage-Price Dynamics 35
Figure 1 Year-over-Year Unit Labor Costs Growth and Inﬂation:
1952Q1–1999Q2
Figure 3 provides a perspective on the long-run relation between the price
levelandthelevelofunitlaborcosts. Asinpreviousresearch,theevidencedis-
cussedbelowindicatesthatthepricelevelandunitlaborcostsseries(p,w−q)
are cointegrated over the full sample period 1952Q1 to 1999Q2 (Engle and
Granger 1987). Table 1 presents the estimated cointegrating regression. Fig-
ure 3 charts the actual price level and the price level predicted by the cointe-
grating regression, which includes only the level of unit labor costs. As can
be seen, these two series move together over most of the sample period, even
during the period since the early 1980s when short-run correlation between
thegrowthratesofthesetwoseriesweakenedsigniﬁcantly. However, onestill
cannottellfromFigure3whetherthislong-runcomovementistheresultofthe
price level adjusting to the level of unit labor costs, unit labor costs adjusting
to the price level, or both. In order to determine the source of the long-run
comovement, I now turn to results from tests performed for Granger-causality
and weak exogeneity.36 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 2 Year-over-Year Wage Growth and Inﬂation: 1952Q1–1999Q2
Tests for Weak Exogeneity
Before I perform tests for Granger-causality, I need to investigate whether
there exists a cointegrating relation between the price level and unit labor
costsduringthesampleperiodstudiedhere. Thoughinmanypreviousstudies
it has been shown that these two series are indeed cointegrated,8 I repeat the
test because the sample period covered in previous research differs from the
one used here.
Panel A in Table 1 presents the Engle and Granger (1987) test for coin-
tegration.9 The test results indicate that the price level and unit labor costs
are cointegrated over 1952Q1 to 1999Q2, implying the presence of a long-run
equilibrium relation between the level of unit labor costs and the price level
as in (4).
In order to determine if this cointegrating regression can be interpreted as
thelong-termpriceorwageequation,Ipresenttestresultsforweakexogeneity
in panel B of Table 1. Those results indicate that in the system (pt,(w−qt)),
unit labor costs are not weakly exogenous but the price level is, meaning
8 See, for example, Mehra (1993), Hu and Trehan (1995), Hess (1999), and Ghali (1999).
9 The unit root tests (not reported) indicate that wage and price series are integrated of order
one, meaning these series are stationary after differencing once.Y. Mehra: Wage-Price Dynamics 37
Figure 3 Actual and Predicted Price Level: 1952Q1–1999Q2
wages,notprices,adjustinresponsetodeviationsinthelong-runcointegrating
relation. Hence the cointegrating regression here cannot be interpreted as the
price equation and thus contradicts the cost-push view.
If we rewrite the estimated cointegration regressions reported in panel A
of Table 1 as wage regressions, we get (11).
Without Trend : (w − q)t = .25 + .94pt; (11)
With Trend : (w − q)t =− .05 + .001TR t + 1.0pt
The test results for weak exogeneity imply that one can interpret (11) as the
long-run wage equation. The estimated coefﬁcient that appears on the price
level in (11) is not different from unity, indicating that unit labor costs have
adjustedone-for-onewiththepricelevelinthelongrun. Togethertheseresults
suggest that the long-run comovement of the price level and unit labor costs
charted in Figure 3 has arisen mainly as a result of unit labor costs adjusting
to the price level rather than the other way around.38 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 1 Engle-Granger Test for Cointegration
Panel A: Cointegrating Regressions: 1952Q1–1999Q2
Without Trend With Trend
pt =− .26 + 1.06(w − q)t; pt = .05 + .001TR t + .94(w − q)t
ADF =− 3.52* ADF =− 5.02*
Panel B: Error-Correction Coefﬁcients: Test for Weak Exogeneity
Inﬂation Regression Unit Labor Costs Regression
λp(t-statistic) λw(t-statistic)
Without Trend .017(1.9) .16(5.2)
With Trend .007(.58) .27(5.9)
∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Notes: p is the chain-weighted GDP deﬂator; w is compensation per man hour; q is
output per man hour; and TR is a linear trend. All variables except TR are in their
natural logarithms, so that w − q is unit labor costs. ADF is the augmented Dickey-
Fuller statistic; it tests ρ = 0 in regressions of the form
 Ut = ρUt−1 +
 k
s=1 bt−s Ut−s;
where U is the residual from the cointegrating regression reported in panel A. The co-
efﬁcients reported in panel B are from error-correction regressions of the form
 pt = b0+λpUt−1+
 k
j=1 b1j pt−j; (w−q) = c+λwUt−1+
 k
j=1 c1j (w−q)t−j,
where all variables are deﬁned as above. The optimal lag length k used is 4, as indicated
by the Akaike information criterion plus 2 (Pantula, Gonzalez-Farias, and Fuller 1994).
Granger-Causality Tests
The discussion above has focused on sources of the presence of the long-run
correlation between the price level and unit labor costs as reﬂected in the
cointegrating regression. Now I present results on the nature of the short-run
feedback between the growth rates of these variables, using tests for Granger-
causality. The short-run inﬂation and wage equations that underlie these tests
are given in (9) and (10), which include one-period lagged value of the resid-
ual from the cointegrating regression reported in Table 1 (the cointegrating
regression used is the one without trend).10 I present results for the full sam-
ple1953Q1to1999Q2aswellasforsubsamples1953Q1to1965Q4, 1966Q1
to 1983Q4, and 1984Q1 to 1999Q2.11 Table 2 presents results with the cycli-
cal demand measured by the output gap, and Table 3 contains results with the
cyclical demand measured by changes in the civilian unemployment rate.
10 I get qualitatively similar results if the cointegrating regression used is the one with trend.
11 The estimation period for inﬂation and wage growth regressions begins in 1953Q1, earlier
observations being used to capture lags in these equations.Y. Mehra: Wage-Price Dynamics 39
Table 2 Testing for Short-Run Feedback: GDP Deﬂator and Unit
Labor Costs
Output Gap as a Measure of Cyclical Demand









































∗Signiﬁcant at the .05 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the .10 percent level.
Notes: The coefﬁcients reported above are from regressions of the form
 pt = b0+λpUt−1+
 4
j=1 b1j pt−j +
 4




 (w − q)t = c0 + λwUt−1 +
 4
j=1 c1j (w − qt−j) +
 4
j=1 c2j (p − (w − q))t−j +
 4
j=1 c3jCDt−j + ε2t,
where CD is cyclical demand measured by the output gap; and U is the residual from
the cointegrating regression (without the trend) reported in Table 1. F1 tests λp,b2j = 0;
F2 tests λw,c2j = 0; SUMw is the sum of b2j coefﬁcients and SUMp is the sum of
c2j coefﬁcients. The lag length used is indicated by the Akaike information criterion
plus 2 (Pantula, Gonzalez-Farias, and Fuller 1994).
As indicated before, wage growth is an independent source of cost-push
inﬂation if the sum of estimated coefﬁcients
 s
j=1 b2j that appear on lagged
wage growth in (9) is positive and statistically different from zero, its esti-
mated magnitude measuring the size of the feedback from wage growth to
inﬂation. Table 2 presents the pertinent F- and t-statistics, as well as estimates
of the sum of coefﬁcients
 s
j=1 b2j. If we focus on full sample estimates,
the estimated coefﬁcients, b2j,j = 1,4, are signiﬁcant by the conventional
F-statistic, indicating that wage growth Granger-causes inﬂation (see the F1-
statistic in Table 2).12 However, the full sample estimates also indicate that
the estimated sum
 s
j=1 b2j is small in magnitude and not different from
12 The lag length used here is selected by the Akaike information criterion plus 2 (Pantula,
Gonzalez-Farias, and Fuller 1994). With this selection of lag length, tests discussed in Pantula,
Gonzalez-Farias, and Fuller (1994) are shown to have more power. Nevertheless, results here are
robust to changes in lag length.40 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 3 Testing for Short-Run Feedback: GDP Deﬂator and Unit
Labor Costs
Unemployment Rate as a Measure of Cyclical Demand









































Notes: See notes in Table 2. Table 3 is similar to Table 2, except that cyclical demand
(CD) is measured instead by changes in the civilian unemployment rate.
zero (see the t-statistic in Table 2). These results indicate that the short-run
feedback from wage growth to inﬂation, though statistically signiﬁcant, is
quantitatively small and transient in nature, disappearing within a year. In
contrast, the estimated sum of coefﬁcients (
 s
j=1 c2j) that appear on lagged
inﬂation in wage growth equation (10) is statistically signiﬁcant and large in
magnitude (see F2- and t-statistics in Table 2). In fact, the estimated sum of
these coefﬁcients
 s
j=1 c2j is not different from unity, indicating that wage
growth adjusts one-for-one with inﬂation. Together the full sample results are
consistentwiththepresenceofabi-directionalfeedbackbetweeninﬂationand
wage growth, though the size of the feedback from wage growth to inﬂation
is quantitatively modest and transitory in nature.
If we focus on subsample estimates, we ﬁnd that they indicate the result
above: Wage growth Granger-caused inﬂation is not robust to changes in the
sample period. In particular, wage growth does not Granger-cause inﬂation
over two low inﬂation subperiods considered here, 1953Q1 to 1965Q4 and
1984Q1 to 1999Q2, and the sum of estimated coefﬁcients
 s
j=1 b2j that ap-
pear on lagged wage growth is also zero (see F1- and t-statistics in Table 2).
However, if we consider the high inﬂation subperiod 1966Q1 to 1983Q4, then
results indicate wage growth does Granger-cause inﬂation. Moreover, the
estimated sum
 s
j=1 b2j is large, indicating the presence of a signiﬁcant feed-
back from wage growth to inﬂation. Together these results indicate that wage
growth is not an “independent” source of inﬂation because it helps predict in-
ﬂation only during the sample period of high and rising inﬂation. In contrast,
the subperiod estimates of the coefﬁcients, c2jj = 1,4, that measure feed-
back from inﬂation to wage growth are not sensitive to changes in the sampleY. Mehra: Wage-Price Dynamics 41
period. In all three subperiods considered here, inﬂation does Granger-cause
wage growth. Furthermore, the estimated sum
 s
j=1 c2j is always statisti-
cally signiﬁcant and mostly close to unity, implying that wage growth adjusts
one-for-one with inﬂation (see F2- and t-statistics in Table 2).
The Granger-causality test results presented in Table 2 are based on inﬂa-
tion and wage growth regressions estimated with the output gap as a measure
of the cyclical demand. In order to assess whether Granger-causality results
are robust to changes in the measure of the cyclical demand used, Table 3
contains results when the cyclical demand is measured instead by changes in
the civilian unemployment rate. As can be seen, these alternative Granger-
causality test results yield inferences about the nature of feedback between
inﬂation and wage growth that are qualitatively similar to those produced by
results in Table 2. In particular, wage growth does Granger-cause inﬂation in
the full sample period, but then this result is not robust across all subperiods.
3. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The cost-push view of the inﬂation process that is implicit in the expectations-
augmented Phillips curve model assigns a key role to wage growth in deter-
mininginﬂation. Inthisarticle,Ievaluatethisrolebyinvestigatingempirically
boththepresenceandstabilityofthefeedbackbetweenwagegrowthandinﬂa-
tion during the U.S. postwar period, 1952Q1 to 1999Q2. The results indicate
that wage growth does help predict future inﬂation over the full sample period
considered here. However, this ﬁnding is very fragile, and it appears in the
full sample because the estimation period includes the subperiod 1966Q1 to
1983Q4 during which inﬂation steadily accelerated. Wage growth does not
helppredictinﬂationintwoothersubperiods,1953Q1to1965Q4and1984Q1
to 1999Q2, during which inﬂation remained low to moderate. In contrast, in-
ﬂation always helps predict wage growth, a ﬁnding that is both quantitatively
signiﬁcant and stable across subperiods. These results thus do not support the





since the early 1980s is the period during which the Fed has concentrated on
keeping inﬂation low. What is new here is the ﬁnding that even in the pre-
1980 period there is another subperiod, 1953Q1 to 1965Q4, during which
wage growth does not help predict inﬂation. This is also the subperiod during
which inﬂation remained mostly low, mainly due to monetary policy pursued
by the Fed (Webb 1995).42 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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